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 Direct Democracy as Necessary Evil?: Perspectives from Interest Group Leaders 
  
 Recently, some of the most controversial issues in American politics have not 
been decided in legislatures, but by the citizenry through the means of direct democracy.  
Polarizing issues such as marriage equality, abortion rights, raising the minimum wage, 
marijuana legalization, public healthcare, gun control, and stem cell research have 
garnered a great deal of national attention, while appearing on isolated state ballots across 
the country.  The appearance of ballot-box lawmaking has witnessed a steady increase 
beginning in the 1970s.  In fact, the previous decade saw the most initiatives in American 
history.1   
This activity has brought a great deal of attention to the direct democracy 
process.2  In particular, concern has surfaced that policy made through these means is 
especially susceptible to manipulations by powerful interest groups and skilled political 
consultants.  Central to many studies of direct democracy is the effect these actors have 
upon public policy.  Whether or not policy made through this system best serves the 
citizenry is more than an academic question.  Evaluating the merits of direct democracy 
is a difficult task.  One way scholars have sought to do so is by asking those “in the 
know” what they think about the process.   
This study investigates what interest group leaders think of the direct democracy 
process.  Specifically, the perceptions of group leaders in three states—California, 
Michigan, and South Carolina are examined.  In their study of the increasing movement 
towards direct democracy, Russell Dalton, Wilhelm Bürklin and Andrew Drummond 
question whether, “direct democracy may become a tool for established political interests 
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to court public support for their causes, unmediated by political parties or elites.”3  This 
question is addressed by examining whether group leaders perceive the process as 
benefiting the citizenry at-large or whether they believe it is too often manipulated by 
powerful, well-funded interests.  Toward this end, a group’s experience with direct 
democracy, the type of group, and the group’s organizational characteristics are 
examined to assess how these factors affect a group’s evaluation of the institution.       
 
Perceived Effects on Democracy 
Trying to gauge influence in American politics has always been a troubling 
proposition.  Nonetheless, one way scholars have sought to understand influence is by 
consulting with elites.  Political professionals are in a unique position to evaluate the 
game of influence in electoral politics.  A particularly well-developed stream of research 
exists  in respect to influence in the direct democracy arena.  
Several studies examine how political consultants and political marketing firms 
view their impact upon the political system. Specific attention focuses on their 
involvement with the direct democracy process.  Given the approbation that many feel 
toward the so-called “initiative industry,” it is informative to see how these individuals 
believe they affect the political system.  Despite popular accounts of mercenary-like 
behavior, most do not believe they pervert the public’s will.  Todd Donovan, Shaun 
Bowler, and David McCuan find that many consultants take on causes to which they are 
closely aligned.4  Rather than being open to the highest bidder, consultants simply 
gravitate toward ballot measures they would like to see passed.  Their findings suggest 
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that consultants take into account many factors beyond a lucrative paycheck when they 
agree to take on a ballot campaign.     
 In their survey of campaign professionals, 73 percent of David Magleby and 
Kelly Patterson’s respondents agreed that initiatives have a “somewhat” or “very 
positive” effect upon democracy.5  However, they found that 57 percent of their 
respondents believed that “initiatives expand the power of special interests.”6  Moreover, 
they contend that “the initiative process is … less democratic than is sometimes believed 
because of the control that special interest groups have in the process.”7  They suggest 
that interest groups are best able to participate in direct democracy due to their 
organization and money.   
 In spite of this research, citizens consistently support the direct democracy 
process.  Stephen Griffin describes what he terms “California constitutionalism” and its 
role relative to representative democracy.8  California constitutionalism refers to the 
abundance of direct democracy campaigns in the state that run parallel to the three 
branches of government.  Griffin argues that the ubiquity of ballot campaigns occurs due 
to a lack of trust in representative institutions.  “Put simply, citizens are more likely to 
favor direct democracy when they distrust politicians and how the government works (or 
appears to work).”9  He contends that while many may evaluate the flaws of direct 
democracy, such arguments must be balanced against the flaws perceived of our 
representative institutions.  Put another way, if citizens had greater trust in the branches 
of government, there would be little need for the initiative, referendum, or recall.  Trust 
in the three branches of government is a widely documented lament among political 
scientists.  For instance, only about one in four American citizens “trust government to do 
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what is right most of the time.”10  Supporting Griffin’s thesis, Mark Baldassare notes that 
“voters often prefer to turn to citizen initiatives to make public policies because of their 
impatience with the speed of the legislative process and their distrust of the decisions that 
politicians make.”11  
 While data on the subject is scarce, polling from several states is instructive.  For 
instance, a poll of California voters conducted after the November 2010 elections found 
that 66 percent of voters were either “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with the 
initiative process.12  In fact, 60 percent of voters were either “somewhat happy” or “very 
happy” to have voted on the nine initiatives appearing on the ballot that year.13  
Conversely, the same study found that 66 percent of voters had little-to-no confidence in 
policymaking produced by the state’s elected officials.14  In that same election cycle, 
voters in the state of Washington were even more enthusiastic regarding the virtues of 
direct democracy.  Nearly three out of four voters in the state agreed that “ballot 
measures were a good thing,” with only one in ten indicating that “ballot measures were a 
bad thing.”15 
These polls suggest that citizens express far greater confidence in law made 
through direct democracy than laws made through representative democracy.  Citizens 
further believe that special interests are more inclined to get what they want through the 
legislative process, than through the direct democracy process.  A 2011 survey conducted 
by Mark Baldassare, Dean Bonner, Sonja Petek, and Jui Shrestha found that 62 percent of 
voters in the state of California thought decisions made through the initiative process 
were better than those made by the governor or legislature.16  Less than a quarter of those 
surveyed believed that decisions made by the citizenry were worse than those made by 
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policymakers.  Taken together, these polls suggest that the citizenry has much greater 
confidence in direct democracy over representative democracy.   
Moreover, Todd Donovan and Jeffrey Karp find that such support for direct 
democracy is generally widespread among the citizenry.17  This support has not only been 
witnessed in the United States, but throughout many countries in Europe as well.  While 
Donovan and Karp note that the trend in greater usage of direct democracy may have 
occurred due to an increase in the distrust in representative governments, they also note 
that the rise of such practices could also have occurred through greater enthusiasm and 
desire among citizens to be more directly involved in political affairs.18  They set out to 
understand the motivation among those who are supportive of direct democracy as a 
means toward public policymaking.  Although their research examines support for direct 
democracy across six nations, their findings are relevant to the research presented here.  
Among their most interesting findings is that younger voters are more enthusiastic about 
direct democracy as are those whose party is not in the majority.19   Their findings were 
mixed when it comes to the dissatisfaction with representative democracy argument.  
While they found support for that view in several countries, they found the opposite to be 
true in at least one country.  Thus, it would appear further research is warranted to better 
understand which citizens are more or less likely to support direct democracy as an 
institution.   
It is clear that scholars have learned a great deal about perceptions of direct 
democracy.  This is particularly the case among those in the electorate and the public 
relations firms charged with running direct democracy campaigns.  However, one 
important player that is absent from our understanding of perceptions of influence in 
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these campaigns is that of organized interests.  While they are major players, few studies 
have analyzed who interest groups perceive is advantaged through citizen lawmaking.  
This study seeks to fill this void by asking interest group leaders what they think of the 
process.   
Data and Methods 
To find out what organizers think of the direct democracy process, a large-scale 
survey was distributed to groups in three states—California, Michigan, and South 
Carolina. These states were chosen for several reasons.  Direct democracy usage varies a 
great deal among these states.  California is viewed as a high user, Michigan as a 
moderate user, and since South Carolina only has the legislative referendum, it is seen as 
an infrequent user.  As well, the power of interest groups in these states varies quite a 
great deal.  Clive Thomas and Ronald Hrebenar classify South Carolina as having a 
dominant interest group system, California as having a dominant/complimentary interest 
group system, and Michigan as having a complementary interest group system.20  
Consequently, the power of interest groups in each of these states is thought to differ 
significantly.  Although groups were surveyed in only three states, the sample states 
represent a nice cross-section of the American states.  This design is similar in many 
ways to other studies of interest group behavior in the U.S.21 
Each survey was addressed to the ‘Director/Executive’ for each organization.  
After obtaining lists of organizations registered to lobby in each of the states, an attempt 
was made to eliminate the names of all organizations that appeared to be non-
membership organizations.  This included corporations, government entities, think tanks, 
colleges and universities, and hospitals. This decision yielded a list of 511 groups in 
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Michigan and 221 groups in South Carolina. Surveys were sent to all groups on the final 
list in these states. Unfortunately, financial resources limited the ability to survey all 
groups in California.  Thus, 350 groups were randomly selected (from a list of over 
1,000) to survey. The surveys were circulated in two waves during the spring of 2003, 
providing a snapshot of group perceptions during that time period.   
The response rates were as follows: 38 percent from South Carolina (84 
responses), 37 percent from Michigan (189 responses), and 38 percent from California 
(133 responses). The overall response rate was 37.8 percent.  These rates compare quite 
favorably with those of similar mail surveys. Although the decision to eliminate non-
membership groups may miss important behavior, the number of groups contacted and 
the diversity of the sample states provide a fair account of group perceptions of direct 
democracy in the United States.  Moreover, the data provides an important bridge to 
information gleaned in the previously mentioned studies of elite opinions relating to 
direct democracy.    
While scholars know how campaign professionals and citizens perceive the direct 
democracy process, surprisingly little is known about what interest group leaders think of 
the process.  Given the important role of interest groups in direct democracy campaigns, 
it is worthwhile to examine who their leaders believe is advantaged by the institution.  
Particular attention is devoted to understanding how institutional context (i.e., state usage 
of direct democracy), direct democracy involvement, group type, and group 
characteristics influence group perceptions.   
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Group Perceptions of Direct Democracy 
 Previous research suggests that campaign professionals believe that initiatives 
positively impact democracy.22  To understand what group leaders think of the process, 
they were asked to indicate whether or not they agreed or disagreed with a number of 
common arguments surrounding the practice of direct democracy.  These arguments can 
be categorized as positive and negative assessments of direct democracy.  Common 
criticisms include the manipulation of voters by special interests through political 
marketing techniques, the dominance of the institution by an initiative industry, that 
money is unduly influential in these campaigns, that direct democracy leads to the 
tyranny of the majority, and the inability of voters to understand initiative proposals.  
Proponents claim direct democracy allows citizens to voice their opinions, holds 
government accountable to the people, and that wealth does not equate to influence in 
these campaigns.  Tables 1 and 2 (appendix 1 and 2) delineate how group leaders 
perceive these arguments enveloping direct democracy.  A number of interesting, yet 
ambivalent findings surface from this exercise.   
 Table 1 presents data relating to negative arguments concerning direct democracy.  
The numbers represent the percent of groups in each of the states that agree with the 
negative statements about direct democracy.  A great amount of disparity occurs across 
states and questions.  However, several consistent patterns persist.  For instance, 
agreement with the negative assessments appears to concentrate in three tiers.  These tiers 
remain consistent across the states and among the questions asked.  The greatest amount 
of agreement occurs among those group leaders believing that organized interests mislead 
the populace through deceptive advertising and those agreeing that a sophisticated 
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initiative industry dominate the process.  Greater ambivalence occurs when it comes to 
the influence of money in ballot contests.  Leaders on the whole are not in agreement 
whether wealthy interests get what they want in ballot contests.  Although one could 
reasonably assume a group’s budget and the type of group would direct the answers to 
this line of questioning, no apparent connections emerged.  Finally, leaders were reticent 
to suggest that citizens were incompetent to decide policy at the ballot box or that direct 
democracy leads to a tyranny of the majority.   
 When looking more specifically at how group leaders in these states view direct 
democracy, it appears that groups in California are more skeptical than are groups in 
Michigan and South Carolina.  The starkest difference can be seen in whether leaders 
believe citizens are competent to evaluate particular legislative proposals.  Nearly half of 
the groups in California (45 percent) believe that citizens are incompetent, while only 1 
in 5 groups in Michigan and South Carolina agree that citizens are incompetent.  The 
same pattern occurs among many of the other questions.  It appears that the greater the 
exposure to direct democracy, the more skepticism occurs among groups.  South Carolina 
leaders have very little exposure given that only the legislative referendum is available in 
the state, and they are the least critical of direct democracy among the sample states.  
This observation suggests that exposure to the practice of direct democracy may generate 
lower levels of efficacy among groups relative to the institution.  Alternatively, less 
experience with direct democracy yields less skepticism over its practice.  Thus one’s 
experience with the institution alters one’s confidence in the institution.  This finding is 
important to consider among those who would like to see the practice spread to states 
with little direct democracy usage.     
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 This finding is echoed when considering how group leaders perceive the benefits 
associated with direct democracy.  Table 2 documents these findings.  This time, the 
numbers represent the percent of groups in each of the states that agree with the positive 
statements about direct democracy.  A robust 71 percent of leaders in the sample believe 
that direct democracy is a valuable tool for ordinary citizens.  A strong majority further 
believe that the institution helps keep government accountable (64 percent) and acts as a 
much needed check on the power of government (59 percent).  However, these findings 
are difficult to square with Table 1’s finding that 80 percent also believe that the process 
is susceptible to special interest groups who influence voters through misleading 
statements and deceptive advertising.  Yet, it appears that just as California group leaders 
were more likely to be critical of direct democracy, they are also less likely to show their 
support for the institution.  A group’s participation in direct democracy was expected to 
affect its assessments of the institution.  However, assessments among users and non-
users were virtually identical.  A group’s exposure to the process at the macro-level (i.e., 
by state) appears to be more significant to its assessments of the institution than its 
exposure to the process at the micro-level (i.e., the group’s own experiences).  This 
observation deserves further investigation.   
To explore the findings further, a number of bivariate correlations were run to 
examine these relationships in more detail.  Table 3 in the appendix presents the results of 
only those variables where statistically significant relationships could be established.  A 
negative sign indicates a negative relationship between the two variables whereas no sign 
represents a positive relationship between the two variables.  For instance, those that have 
drafted a ballot measure disagree that direct democracy leads to a “tyranny of the 
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majority.”  Conversely, Table 3 shows that trade groups would agree with that direct 
democracy may very well lead to a “tyranny of the majority.”   
Surprisingly, a number of relationships that were anticipated simply did not 
surface.  For example, the size of a group’s budget did not reveal any statistically 
significant relationships with various perceptions relating to the benefits or problems 
associated with direct democracy.  One would expect the conflict expansion associated 
with direct democracy would be particularly attractive to citizen groups.  These groups 
would seem to have the most to gain by having the citizenry at-large involved in 
policymaking, rather than limiting the process to the state legislature.  After all, Elisabeth 
Gerber’s examination of the Populist Paradox hinges on the ability of citizen groups to 
effectively advocate among the masses vis-à-vis ballot campaigns.23  However, the 
survey suggests that citizen groups did not show any marked associations to these 
statements about direct democracy.  Yet, group type does appear to affect one’s 
perceptions of the process.  This is taken up further below.   
Table 3 allows one to explore the findings from Tables 1 and 2 regarding state 
context in greater detail.  To understand how one’s experience with direct democracy 
affects perceptions of the institution, Table 3 examines those groups that have drafted a 
ballot measure—which would indicate the most active among direct democracy 
participants.  Next, how group leaders in South Carolina and California perceive the 
process is examined.  These reflect the states with the least and most exposure to direct 
democracy.  Finally, different types of interest groups are examined (i.e., trade 
associations, charities, and labor unions) to gather what they think about the institution.  
As noted above, no statistically significant relationships could be drawn from citizen 
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groups and professional associations in relation to their evaluation of direct democracy.  
It is thought that trade associations may be less likely to support ballot-box policymaking, 
while charities and labor unions may be more supportive of such measures given the 
expanded scope of conflict in these contests.   
Table 3 examines perceptions of direct democracy along two fronts.  First, it 
details whether group leaders believe direct democracy is perceived as good government 
(loosely constituted).  Specifically, it presents information detailing whether group 
leaders believe that direct democracy leads to a tyranny of the majority, if it is a valuable 
tool for ordinary citizens, if it is desirable because it helps to keep government 
accountable, whether it serves as a valuable check on the power of government and if 
they believe direct democracy is harmful because of incompetent voters.  Second, Table 3 
presents information detailing the most common criticism of direct democracy—that it is 
a process dominated by wealthy interests.  To understand this better, leaders were asked 
if they believe direct democracy is dominated by an initiative industry composed of 
political consultants, public relations firms, and interest groups; if they believe that direct 
democracy contests have been captured by wealthy interests; whether they believe that 
the side with the most money prevails in direct democracy campaigns; if they think that 
wealthy groups dominate direct democracy contests; and whether they believe that the 
process is susceptible to groups who work to deceive the citizenry.   
Those that have drafted a ballot measure report being much more supportive of 
direct democracy as an institution.  They do not agree that the process leads to a tyranny 
of the majority and these groups show positive correlations with those statements 
suggesting the process keeps government accountable, checks the power of government, 
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and is a valuable tool for ordinary citizens.  Perhaps users see that direct democracy 
provides an additional point of access to affect change upon public policy.  Boehmke has 
found that states with more permissive forms of the institution have higher interest group 
populations.24  Having direct democracy as an additional tool may lead to greater 
participation among groups and therefore amongst the citizenry.  Non-users may see 
direct democracy as an impediment to their getting what they want through conventional 
means.  It has been argued that the initiative and referendum processes widen the scope 
of conflict and thereby create disturbances in cozy relationships between established 
groups and public policymakers.25   
Given their commitment to drafting a ballot measure, it would be surprising if 
users would have seen the institution negatively.  Yet, when it comes to criticisms of 
direct democracy, it appears that groups who have drafted ballot measures are a bit more 
ambivalent.  The only statistical relationship that emerged was that users of direct 
democracy agree that it is a process dominated by an initiative industry composed of 
political consultants, public relations firms, and wealthy interest groups.  So while 
practitioners of direct democracy believe it is a valuable tool for citizens and works to 
check the power of government, they apparently believe the process is shaped by this 
industry—an industry that may not be equally accessible to all groups.   
When examining state context, Michigan groups showed no statistical 
relationships to the questions posed in Table 3.  However, several of the trends noted in 
Tables 1 and 2 continue to appear here.  While groups in both South Carolina and 
California are silent in their perceptions of the merits of direct democracy, they differ 
substantially in their perceptions of the criticisms of the institution.  Leaders of groups in 
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South Carolina show strong negative relationships to questions relating to the importance 
of money in initiative campaigns, while leaders in California appear to agree that the 
process is dominated by an initiative industry, wealthy groups have undue influence, and 
that the side with the most money tends to prevail in direct democracy contests.  This 
speaks to the suggestion that experience with the institution matters.  Whether this 
experience occurs at the macro or micro level seems to affect how groups perceive the 
process.  It is clear that very different relationships are established among users of the 
process (as seen in column one) from those at the macro-level (as seen in the differences 
between those who have drafted a ballot measure and those groups answering from 
different states).  Predictably, direct democracy users are quite supportive of the process.  
However, group leaders in California (where direct democracy is much more prevalent) 
are much less likely to see its benefits and much more likely to agree that it is a process 
that has been captured by wealthy interests than are group leaders in South Carolina, 
which has minimal experience with direct democracy.  This finding deserves further 
examination.     
Considering how different group leaders view the process yields several 
interesting findings.  First, trade associations are much more critical of direct democracy 
as producing good government than are charities and labor unions.  Furthermore, trade 
associations agree that the process leads to the tyranny of the majority and it is harmful 
due to incompetent voters.  Of course, trade associations are often thought to enjoy close 
relationships with policymakers and therefore may have the most to lose by opening the 
lawmaking process up to the citizenry through direct democracy.   
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Charities disagree with the notion that direct democracy leads to a tyranny of the 
majority.  Similarly, labor unions show a positive statistical relationship with the 
statement that the process provides a valuable check on the power of government.  A 
similar pattern emerges when considering how these different group types evaluate the 
process in regard to the role of money in these contests.  Trade associations take issue 
with the statements that direct democracy has been captured by wealthy interests, that the 
side with the most money tends to prevail, and that wealthy groups dominate the process.  
Conversely, labor unions agree that in direct democracy contests, the side with the most 
money tends to prevail.  Similarly, charities appear to show more faith in the process as 
these groups do not agree that citizens are susceptible to groups deceiving them in direct 
democracy campaigns.  Additionally, charities seem to take issue with the statement that 
the direct democracy process is dominated by an initiative industry.   
Data from Table 3 suggests that, not surprisingly, direct democracy users are most 
supportive of the institution.  These same groups believe that the process is dominated by 
an initiative industry that may not be available to all groups. Similarly, group leaders in 
California (the state with the most experience with direct democracy) are most critical of 
the role of money in direct democracy campaigns.  Additionally, trade associations differ 
greatly from other groups in their perceptions of the process.  In particular, these leaders 
are most likely to agree that the process creates majoritarian policies and is harmful due 
to incompetent voters.  These groups also are most likely to question whether direct 
democracy keeps government accountable, serves as a valuable check on government, or 
is a valuable tool for ordinary citizens.  Finally, trade associations are much less likely to 
agree that money plays an important role in ballot contests.   In short, the leaders of trade 
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associations in this sample would likely prefer policymaking through more traditional 
means that would be less likely to draw public attention to their policy interests.    
Conclusion 
While some research has been conducted to investigate the perceptions of 
campaign professionals relative to the direct democracy process, little has been done to 
examine what interest group leaders think about direct democracy.  This study sought to 
fill this void.  The data suggests that group leaders most closely associated with direct 
democracy view the institution as a necessary evil.  This is especially true when 
considering a group’s experience with the institution.  On the micro-level, those groups 
who have drafted a ballot measure believe it is an important institution, yet recognize that 
it is a process that may be dominated by political consultants, public relations firms, and 
wealthy interest groups.  On the macro-level, California groups are most likely to agree 
that money plays an important part in direct democracy contests.  On the whole, most 
group leaders in the sample believe the process seeks to manipulate the populace, that the 
initiative industry dominates campaigns, and that money is likely to determine outcomes.  
They also agree that direct democracy serves as a valuable check on government and acts 
to hold government accountable to the people.   
It is worth noting that the enthusiasm among leaders in this sample is not as 
strong as that found in similar surveys of both the citizenry and political consultants.  
Among interest groups, much more skepticism appears to exist in their assessments of 
direct democracy.  This skepticism is most pronounced among California group leaders—
those who have the greatest exposure to the direct democracy process.  Conversely, those 
with the least experience with the institution have the least concern regarding potential 
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problems associated with direct democracy.  These findings have implications for those 
states considering broadening their own experiences with direct democracy.  In all, these 
findings represent a significant advancement concerning interest group perceptions of 
direct democracy.  While the public continues to support the institution of direct 
democracy, the survey suggests that “those in the know” express some ambivalence 
regarding the vices and virtues of direct democracy.  This is particularly the case when it 
comes to the perceived dominance of wealthy interests in the process.  Whether a group 
has drafted an initiative and whether one has much experience with initiatives at the state-
level largely determines how groups perceive the process.  These findings are instructive 
as advocates consider expanding direct democracy practices throughout the United 
States.     
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Table 1.  Negative Assessments Relative to Direct Democracy by State 
Statement 
                % Agreeing  
 
CA (n = 126) MI (n = 175) SC (n = 74) All Groups 
Initiatives, referenda and other forms of direct democracy are susceptible to special 
interest groups that influence voters by the way of misleading statements and 
deceptive advertising 
80 82 76 80 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy tend to be dominated by 
sophisticated political consultants, lawyers, and paid signature-gatherers 
79* 71* 55* 70 
In initiative, referenda, and recall campaigns, the side with the most money tends to 
prevail 
68* 56* 39* 57 
Wealthy interest groups dominate initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct 
democracy at the expense of the public interest 
65* 57* 46* 57 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy have been captured by the 
wealthy interest whose power they were designed to curb 
55* 48* 30* 46 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are harmful because voters 
are not competent to judge particular legislative proposals 
45 15 22 20 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are damaging because they 
lead to a ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
20 15 15 17 
Source: Author’s Data; * chi-square significant at .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Notes:  Survey Question – Initiatives and referenda have become quite popular in recent years.  Below you will find a number of statements about 
the wisdom and effectiveness of direct democracy.  We are interested in your opinions about direct democracy.  For each statement, please 
indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or have no opinion.   
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 2.  Positive Assessments Relative to Direct Democracy by State 
 
 
Statement 
               % Agreeing  
 
CA (n = 126) MI (n = 175) SC (n = 74) Total 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are valuable tools through 
which ordinary citizens can register their opinions and desires 
63 76 75 71 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are desirable because they 
keep government officials accountable to the people who put them in power 
62 67 61 64 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy represent a much-needed 
check on the power of government 
59 61 51 59 
In initiative, referenda, and recall campaigns, big spending does not necessarily mean 
big influence 
39* 45* 43* 42 
Source: Author’s Data; * chi-square significant at .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Notes:  Survey Question – Initiatives and referenda have become quite popular in recent years.  Below you will find a number of statements about 
the wisdom and effectiveness of direct democracy.  We are interested in your opinions about direct democracy.  For each statement, please 
indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or have no opinion.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 3.  Bivariate correlations: Direct Democracy as a necessary evil? 
 Drafted a 
Ballot 
Measure 
 
SC CA Trade 
Groups 
Charity Labor 
Union 
 
Direct Democracy as good government 
 
      
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are damaging because they 
lead to a ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
-.102*   .142* -.133*  
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are valuable tools through 
which ordinary citizens can register their opinions and desires 
.123*   -.136**   
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are desirable because they 
keep government officials accountable to the people who put them in power 
.116*   -.115*   
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy represent a much-needed 
check on the power of government 
.122*   -.114*  .119* 
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy are harmful because voters 
are not competent to judge particular legislative proposals 
     .183**     
 
Direct Democracy as tool for the wealthy 
 
      
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy tend to be dominated by 
sophisticated political consultants, lawyers, and paid signature-gatherers 
.130* -.255** .174**    -.101*  
Initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy have been captured by the 
wealthy interest whose power they were designed to curb 
 -.211** .116* -.166**     
In initiative, referenda, and recall campaigns, the side with the most money tends to 
prevail 
 -.213** .164* -.171**  .121* 
Wealthy interest groups dominate initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct 
democracy at the expense of the public interest 
 -.165**    -.128*     
Initiatives, referenda and other forms of direct democracy are susceptible to special 
interest groups that influence voters by the way of misleading statements and deceptive 
advertising 
 -.103*   -.139*  
Notes: * correlation is significant at .05 level (2-tailed); **correlation is significant at .01 level (2-tailed) 
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Survey Question – Initiatives and referenda have become quite popular in recent years.  Below you will find a number of statements about the wisdom and 
effectiveness of direct democracy.  We are interested in your opinions about direct democracy.  For each statement, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, strongly disagree, or have no opinion.  
21
Alexander: Direct Democracy as a Necessary Evil?
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2015
 Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 Dane M. Waters, "Trends in State Initiatives and Referenda" in Book of the States 
(Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments 2002), 239-42.  
2
  The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a great deal of research examining the direct 
democracy process.  See for example, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan,  Demanding 
Choices Opinion, Voting, and Direct Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998); Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert, Citizens as 
Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1998);  David S. Broder, Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the 
Power of Money (New York: Harcourt, 2000);  Richard Ellis, Democratic Delusions: 
The Initiative Process in America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002) and 
Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox Interest Group Influence and the Promise of 
Direct Legislation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
3
 Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm P. Burklin, and Andrew Drummond, "Public Opinion and 
Direct Democracy" Journal of Democracy 12, No. 4 (2001): 151. 
4
 Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and David McCuan, "Political Consultants and the 
Initiative Industrial Complex" in Dangerous Democracy?: The Battle over Ballot 
Initiatives in America, edited by L. J. Sabato, H. R. Ernst, and B. A. Larson,  (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001),101-34. 
5
 David Magleby and Kelly Patterson, “Consultants and Direct Democracy: The Politics 
of Citizen Control” in Campaign Warriors: The Role of Political Consultants in 
Elections, edited by James Thurber and Candice Nelson, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000), 142. 
6
 Ibid., 143. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Stephen Griffin, “California Constitutionalism: Trust in Government and Direct 
Democracy” Journal of Constitutional Law 11, No. 3 (2009): 551. 
9
  Ibid., 552.  
10
 American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies  (Ann Arbor:  
University of Michigan Press, 2014). 
11
 Mark Baldassare, A California State of Mind: The Conflicted Voter in a Changing 
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
12
 Mark Baldassare, Dean Bonner, Sonja Petek, and Nicole Willcoxon, Californians and 
their Government,  San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, Statewide 
Survey, December (2010): 20. 
13
 Ibid., 19.  
14
 Ibid., 18.  
15
 Ibid., 19.  
16
 Baldassare, Bonner, Petek, and Shrestha, Californians and their Government,14. 
17
 Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey Karp, “Popular Support for Direct Democracy,” Party 
Politics, Vol. 12, No. 5. (2006): 671-88. 
18
 Ibid., 672-3.  
19
 Ibid., 680-1.  
22
International Social Science Review, Vol. 90 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol90/iss2/1
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 Clive Thomas, and Ronald Hrebenar,  “Interest Groups in the States” in Politics in the 
American States: A Comparative Analysis, Edited by Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson 
and Herbert Jacob, Seventh Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 
1999), 113-43. 
21
 See for example: Frederick J. Boehmke,  The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: 
How Institutions Shape Interest Group Systems, (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 2005); Elisabeth R.Gerber,  The Populist Paradox Interest Group Influence and 
the Promise of Direct Legislation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) and 
Anthony Nownes, and Patricia Freeman “Interest Group Activity in the States,” Journal 
of Politics 93, April1999, 86–112. 
22
 David Magleby, and Kelly Patterson,  “Consultants and Direct Democracy: The 
Politics of Citizen Control” in Campaign Warriors: The Role of Political Consultants 
in Elections, edited by James Thurberand Candice Nelson,(Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
23
 Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox Interest Group Influence and the Promise 
of Direct Legislation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
24
 Frederick J. Boehmke,  The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: How Institutions 
Shape Interest Group Systems,  (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2005).  
25
 Robert Alexander, “What is Making the Grass Grow? Grassroots versus Grasstops 
Mobilization—A Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Interest Groups in the State 
Initiative Process,”  Political Chronicle vol. 13, no.2,  Fall, 2001. 
 
23
Alexander: Direct Democracy as a Necessary Evil?
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2015
